20 世纪 90 年代以来,中国专利申请量和授权量的快速增长引发社会各界广泛关注。一个重要发现就是,中国专利快速增长并不是由知识产权保护加强或专利保护法律体系完善所导致的,而是由政府政策激励所导致的。若运用零膨胀负二项回归法(ZINB)全面分析中国各省份地区的政府专利资助、补贴和奖励政策对微观企业发明专利、实用新型专利以及外观设计专利这三种类型专利数量增长的影响效应,就能揭开和解释中国专利爆炸式增长之“谜”及其形成机制。尽管中国各省份地区的政府专利资助、补贴和奖励政策,是推 动中国企业三种类型专利申请数量增长的核心因素,但是中国各省份地区的政府专利资助、补贴和奖励政策,对中国企业三种类型专利授权数量增长存在差异性的影响,其中,政府全额资助、补贴和奖励政策更倾向于激励企业对低质量专利的申请。
The“Mystery” of Patent Growth in China
Micro Empirical Evidence from Local Government Innovation Incentive Policy
Zhang Jie ( Renmin University of China)
Abstract Many attentions are paid to the increasing growth of patent in China from the 90’s of the 20th century. It is an important argument that the “mystery” of patent growth in China can be explained by incentive policies of government patent,but not by the intellectual property right protection and the patent law systems. The zero-inflated negative binomial regression method (ZINB) is used to comprehensively analyze the effect of the funding, subsidy and incentive policies of government patent in various provinces of China on the growth of the number of patents in micro- enterprise inventions, utility models and exterior design. This will provide empirical evidence and mechanism from the perspective of government policy of incentive to reveal and explain the “mystery” of China’s explosive patent growth. The results of this paper show that the funding, subsidy and incentive policies of government patent in various provinces in China are the core factors for driving the growth of the number of patent applications for Chinese companies. However, the funding, subsidy and incentive policies of government patent in various provinces in China have different effects on the growth of the number of patents granted to Chinese companies. The interesting phenomenon is that in the regions where the government patents are fully funded, subsidized and rewarded, the number of firm’s patents granted of the three types is relatively small. This shows that the full funding, subsidy and incentive policies of government are more inclined to motivate companies to apply for low-quality patents. Subsequent robustness tests support the fundamental experience findings of this paper.
Key words Chinese patent; intellectual property right protection;the incentive policies of local government; the patent applications; the patent granting; the Patent Law; the negative binomial regression; the poisson’s distribution
张 杰,经济学博士,中国人民大学中国经济改革与发展研究院教授、博士生导师