中美贸易战涉及美国 201 调查、301 调查和 232 调查在《马拉喀什建立世界贸易组织协定》(简称《WTO 协定》)下的合法性问题。随着贸易战的深入,相关法律争议越来越集中在美国可否成功援引 GATT 第 21 条项下的安全例外条款。长期以来,专家组对安全事项是否享有管辖权以及应采取何种标准审查安全例外等问题一直困扰着理论界和实务界。与欧盟、加拿大等 WTO 成员不同,中国并未积极利用 GATT 第 21 条质疑美国贸易措施的合法性。这不仅是因为国家安全涉及主权核心利益,WTO 争端解决机构本不适于解决此类纠纷,也是因为强行在 WTO 体制内解决国家安全事项反而可能最终削减 WTO 的权威。当前,通过谈判磋商机制解决 WTO 成员国家安全关切仍是最佳选择。
Security Exceptions in Sino-US Trade War
Peng Yue (Nanjing University)
Abstract The Sino-US trade war involves the legality of the US 201 investigation, the 301 investigation, and the 232 investigation under the WTO Agreement. As the trade war deepens, relevant legal disputes are increasingly focused on whether the United States can successfully invoke the security exception clause under Article 21 of the GATT. For a long time, whether the Panel has jurisdiction over security matters and what kind of standard should be adopted to review security exceptions have been plaguing the theoretical and practical circles. Unlike other WTO members such as the EU and Canada, China has not actively utilized Article 21 of the GATT to question the legality of US trade measures. It is not simply because national security involves the core interests of sovereignty, which cannot be handled properly by the WTO dispute settlement body. It is also because the forcible resolution of national security issues within the WTO system will ultimately impair WTO’s authority. At present, it is still the best choice to resolve the security concerns of WTO member countries through negotiation and consultation mechanism.
Key words Sino-US Trade War; 201 Investigation; 301 Investigation; 232 Investigation; security exceptions; WTO disputes
彭 岳,法学博士,南京大学法学院教授